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This article examines the role of tJ1e "new" legal institutions i11 bargai11i12g under the 
Employntent Co11tracts Act 1991 through an analysis of case law and legal research. It 
provides an overvieli' of bargaini11g provisions specifically addressi11g: choice of representa-
tives, authorisation, recog~1ition, rights oj ,access, negotiatio11 a11d ratification and critically 
analyses how the legal i11stitutions have interpreted bargaining provisions under the Act. It 
argues that the free market philosophy underpinni11g the new regime is ju1zdame11tally flawed 
and that "free bargai11i11g'' has failed to deliver a workable system. Contrary to the peripheral 
role envisaged by the Act for the "11ew" legal institutions they had little option but to intervene 
and assume ,a traditional role of bala11cirzg the competing interests of employer a11d entployees. 
In the absence of a statuto1y .mandate for intervention, they .. find themselves in an increasing/)' 
precarious position poi11ting to an urgent 11eed for refornt of bargai11ing JJrovisions a11d 
clarification of their role. 
"Certainly courts are not, and ca11not be immune jron1 criticisnt All hun1an i11stitutions are 
imperfect - courts ,as li'ell as tribu11afsu (G·erhart, 1987: 131 ). 
Introduction 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991 (The Act) radically reformed bargaining in New Zealand 
replacing the traditional system of collective bargaining developed over a century with one 
that emphasised .,free .. bargaining. While a measure of consensus developed on the new 
bargaining regime, the future role and structure of the specialist legal institutions continued 
to be a source of contentious debate. 
Proponents of a specialist jurisdiction argued that the employment relationship was not simply 
another form of comm~ercial contract, maintaining the Act was fundamentally flawed because 
it failed to acknowledge the inherent disparity of bargaining power between employer and 
employee. To redress the power imbalance, they called for the retention of a specialist 
jurisdiction claim.ing it was necessary to ensure the effective managem,ent of inevitable 
conflict. 
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Opponents of a specialist jurisdiction on the other hand argued that the ~employment contract 
was lik·e any other contract, based on market exchange, and should be dealt with by courts 
of general jurisdiction. They cont~ended that judicial intervention was philosophically 
inconsistent with the free market principles underpinning the Act. Under a der~egulated system 
of free bargaining they claimed that the market would replace the courts as the sole arbiter 
of justice and, "lead to New .Zealand joining the powerhouse ~economies of the world and 
bring true democracy to workplaces" (National Party, 1991). 
The Act etnerged as an inevitable compromise. The free bargaining framework advocated by 
the Business Roundtable and Treasury was adopted but their preferred institutional structures 
were rejected. A specialist employment jurisdiction survived albeit in a different guise. 
Under the revan1ped specialist jurisdiction, the "new" legal institutions emerged with a 
radically r·edefined role. The emphasis on ent~erprise bargaining and mutual resolution of 
disputes between parties meant that the legal institutions no longer played a pivotal role in the 
bargaining process, ~ensuring equitable employment relations and providing protection Cor the 
parties. Instead the Act relegated them to a residual role of resolving disputes and differences 
arising from the breakdown of employment relations. 
Early d~ecisions under th~e Act signalled that the ''new" legal institutions intended to take a 
cautious approach. In Adams v Alliance Textiles (NZ) Limited [1992] 1 ERNZ 982 the 
Employment Court made its intention clear not to intervene in the bargaining process stating, 
"the Act is quite specific as to the conduct which is prohibited and the Court is not justified 
in putting a gloss on the Act by importing a requirement nowhere expr~essed in it" (989, 1022-
23) However, faced with increasingly problematic bargaining provisions that were incomplete, 
inconsistent or invisible, and incidents of bargaining practices that were the antith~esis of 
playing fair "leading to unrest and disharmony and erosion of mutual trust and confidence thus 
producing an inefficient labour market and defeating the objects of the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991" (Service Workers Union of Aotearoa Inc. v Southern P,acific Hotel Co1poration 
[ 1993] 2 ERNZ 513) the legal institutions had little option but to inteiVene. 
Five years on the legal institutions have been forced to adopt an increasingly interventionist 
role by: ·establishing duties to ensure recognition of bargaining agents, defining negotiation 
and reintroducing tl1e requirement for parties to bargaining in good faith . The alleged move 
towards "judicial activism" has led to intense criticism from employer and business groups 
who call for the abolition of the specialist jurisdiction and a return to common law and 
commonsense. Critics claim that the Act' s intention to radically reshape the labour market 
is being sabotaged by these institutions who persist, against Parliament, s intention, to interpret 
the Act as if the changes it made to the law were minimal (Howard, 1995 : 1 ). Supporters of 
inteiVention, however, praise judicial activisn1 asserting that the specialist legal institutions 
were the saviours of the system. 
Amidst this continuing debate it is tin1ely to ~examine the role of the "new" Jegal institutions 
and to assess their impact on bargaining under the Act through an analysis of the emerging 
case law. 
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The new bargaining regime 
Parts I and II of the Act are dedicated to bargaining. While the Act gives priority to 
establishing a bargaining framework, the provisions are prescriptive and permissive with an 
absence of detail and statutory direction. 
The object of Part 1 of the Act is to establish freedom of association. In th~e context of labour 
law freedom of association is regarded as a fundamental human right usually joined with the 
right to organise and bargain collectively. These rights are set down in major international 
instruments, specifically ILO Convention 87 which concerns Freedom of Association atzd 
Protection of the Right to Organise and ILO Convention 98 concerning the Application of the 
Principles of the Right to Organise and Bargai12 Collectively. While New Zealand has failed 
to ratify thes ~e conventions they are still binding obligations on New Zealand, by virtue of its 
ILO membership. 
Despite ILO obligations the Act adopts a broad interpretation of freedom of association and 
promotes employees' freedom to choose whether or not to enter into collective or individual 
bargaining arrangements. It emphasises an employee's i1zdividual right to enter into an 
employment contract which contrasts sharply with previous legislation whose central purpose 
was to facilitate collective bargaining, acknowledging the inherent imbalance of bargaining 
power between employer and employ~ee. Refer~ence to collective bargaining is conspicuously 
absent from the Act. 
Part IJ of the Act provides a framework for representation and bargaining arrangen1ents. 
Aga:n the Act's overriding objective is to establish the right to choose bargaining 
representatives. Once chosen, a representative is r~equired to establish their authority to 
represent an en1ployee or employ~er under s.l2(1) which states: 
Any person, group, or organisation who or \vhich pmports, in negotiations for an employn1ent 
contract, to repr~esent any employee or en:tployer shall establish the autltority of that person, 
group, or organisation to represent that employee or entployer in those negotiations . 
This section, however, fails to provide any guidelines on what constitutes authorisation. 
Similarly s.12(2) requires that once: 
an employee or employer has authorised a person, group, or organisation to represent the 
employee or employer in negotiations for an employment contract, the employee or employer 
with whom the negotiations ar~e being undertaken shall, subject to s.ll of this Act, recognise 
the authority of that person, gfOup or organisation to represent the entployee or entployer in 
those negotiations. 
Again this section fails to define recognition. Further complications arise where em.ployers 
are obligated to recognise an authorised bargaining representative but are under no statutory 
obligation to negotiate with them. Just what practical assistance this would be to the process 
of bargaining was unclear. 
The issue of access for bargaining representatives presented the institutions with another set 
of problems. While an authorised bargaining repres~entative has a statutory right of access for 
the purpose of obtaining authority to act as a representative, rights of access for the purpose 
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of negotiation are restricted to negotiations with "an employee"' and are required to be at, "a 
reasonable titne. n Legal institutions were left the task of developing a working definition of 
reasonableness to facilitate the bargaining process. This is however nothing new. Statutes 
are frequently dratted as bare legislative frameworks leaving the development of detail up to 
the judiciary. Over the last five years, the interpretation of sections that provide only minimal 
statutory guidelines and draDting anomalies has resulted in a growing volume of controversial 
case law. Key issues regarding bargaining wiH be discussed as follows. 
Choice of r~epres~entation 
Section 10 of the Act which establishes the freedom to choose a bargaining representative 
effectively disenfranchised unions from their exclusive right to represent employees. Under 
the Act, anyone can act as a bargaining representative (with exceptions based on criminal 
convictions under s.ll of the Act) as long as their authorisation is demonstrated. An 
objection to a chosen bargaining agent was raised in Sidebotha111 and Powell v Capital Coast 
Health Ltd [ 1994] 2 ERNZ 431 1. 
Authorisation 
Section 12 requires that any person who represents either an en1ployer or employee in 
negotiation of an en1ployn1ent contract n1ust establish their authority to do so. Again the Act 
does not indicate hO\\' the parties are to do this, something that was left for the courts to 
d etern1 in e. 
The first case to deal with authorisation made it clear that generalised statements of 
authorisation contained in union rules n1ay not be sufficient. In New Zealand Nurses v Arg;,le 
Hospital Ltd [ 1 992] 2 ERNZ 314 a bulk authorisation combined '~ith an application for 
membership of the union was held to be adequate. The Employment Court stressed that while 
it was acceptable in the context of this particular case, a prudent union should obtain specific 
written authorities from each of the en1ployees it represented. The Employment Court 
confirmed in Nel~' Zealand Baking T~ad.es Etc Union (Inc.) v FoodtOli111 Supermarkets Li1nited 
[1992] 3 ERNZ 305 : 
1 
that \\'hil~e nod1ing in the Act prohibited the use of general authorities. it n1ust be plain tl1at tl1is 
\vas tlle intention of the grantor before it n1ay be relied upon. General provisions in union 
rules will not be adequate enough to authorise the union to take specific litigation on behalf 
of its n1en1bers (305 ,313). 
This case involved a conviction under s.231 of the Crirnes Act 1961 for fraudulently destroying a 
docun1ent. TI1e Court declared the objection invalid as it. involved a rnaxin1u1n penalty of three years 
\Vhich fen short of Parliatnent's arbitrary cut off point of five years iinprisontnent. ~Chief Judge 
Goddard cautioned t11at v.rhile t11e section had strict limits its application should be treated " 'ith care. 
Not only did it invoJve double punishtnent but it also involved an indirect penalty against those being 
represented. 
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in BlUing v Wellt'llgton City 33195) 
the withdrawal of their negotiating authority the oa with 
a which was later ratified. The Court, , Wll 
that the plaintiff employees were not bound by the collective employmeat 
C.. law GD&ti- to the& of a · 
who 
a two fold right of access for reprea lat. vta. 
the initial right of for the purpose of 1 
which is on the of the employ.-. Sectioa 14 
subata•,tive right of access by an authorised for 011 of 
an employment contlact. Access must, however, be at aay 
the anticipated the practical difficulties of an 
or the problems associated with defining what is a reasonable dme or, · 
to be exclusive to the negotiation of an individual employment contract is a for 
While the Act purports to provide a substantive riaht of acceas for 
in practice its tenuous nature soon became apparent as some employers 
....... · to use the loopholes to their advantage. 
wu evident in Argyle Hospital where an employer, having pers11aded a number of its 
to sign two year individual contracts, refused to the union oft'lcial aad 
a notice on him. The Employment Trib,mal no difficulty ill 
.... -' s right to access to the workplace. It also noted that tile fact 
llUI"Bes had signed two year individual e•nployment contracts, they were tree at aay stage 
l8lk negotiation of a -eollective contract and that a union official was entitled to access tor 
purpose. 
Hawtin v Skellerup Industrial Ltd [1992] 2 ERNZ 500 an eJllployer sought a pena.lty 
a union for organising a stop work meeting during working hours to a 
collective employment contract. The employer claimed that the of s.14 did 
stop work meetings, being explicidy in the · . While the 
agreed that s.14 was inherently contradictory, it took a commonauase approach to 
u.u.&l! the right of access which could include meetings with a aroup. The Trib1Jnal 
that access had to occur at a reasonable time which logically meant a time when 
.,....,. ... was DOt affected. In practice this meant restricting to lunch tUnes or other 
ckaring the day. 
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w ·hile s.l4 establishes the right of access for bargaining representatives, employers have 
considerable control over the actual terms of the access. In Alliance Textiles the employer 
granted access at 6am in the morning and then only after trying to convince their employees 
to rescind the authority they had given to the representative. Similarly in Argyle Hospital the 
employ~er only allowed the union representative the opportunity to speak to an employee in 
the corridor amidst the general flurry of workplace activity. 
Section 14 places ~urther restrictions on representatives' freedom to bargain by only 
permitting access for the purpose of discussing an employment contract. This effectively 
barred union acoess to the workplace to discuss with their men1bers a range of other 
significant issues such education and training, leading to the criticism that the Act is highly 
selectiv·e about the fre·edoms it affords. 
Early case law emphasised that while the Act establishes a right of access for bargaining 
representativ ~es, this right is limited, reinforcing the underlying presumption that the workplace 
is the private property of the employer. While l ~egal institutions maintained a strict adherence 
to the Act, limiting bargaining representatives' rights to the letter of the law, this contrasted 
starkly with the discretion afforded to employers under the Act who are giv·en every necessary 
mechanism to control employm~ent contracting at the enterprise level. It is not difficult to 
conclude therefore that th~e difficult process of gaining authority, recognition, and then access 
was devis·ed as a deterrent to collective bargaining, where in practice bargaining representa-
tives were all but banned from the workplace. 
Rights of ,access revisited 
The parameters of rights of access were comprehensively review~ed in Service Workers Union 
of New Zealand Aotearoa Inc v Southern Pacific Hotel Cotp (NZ) Ltd {1993} 2 ERNZ 531. 
In this case employees sought compliance orders to .restrain an employer from imposing 
restrictions on a union's entry and access to its members. The e1nployer maintained that the 
peculiar nature of the industry and the requirement of health and safety procedures precluded 
any access to the work premises. Mter an examination of the statutory limitations on the 
right of entry, the Employment ·Court found that under s.l4(2) the employer had to show that 
procedures or requirements existed relating to health and safety and that they were r~easonable, 
and limited or prohibited the entry of persons other than employees. The Employment ~court 
found that s.l4 did impose restrictions on the representatives roan1ing at large through an 
employer's pr~emises by requiring them to report on arrival and adhere to relevant health and 
safety regulations. However it concluded that 
\vhere there is a right of entry and the exercise of the right is Inet with conditions or 
restrictions which are not authorised, then the right is as good as denied. To delay entry, to 
surround it \Vith conditions of the en1ployer' s invention, and to i1npeded it is to refuse entry 
in breach of the prohibition in s.14(5). (531, 532) 
Rights of access und~er s.l4 were further clarifi·ed by the Court of Appeal in Foodstuffs 
(Auckland) Ltd v National Distribution Union Inc [1995] 2 NZLR 280, where an employer 
refused access to an authorised bargaining representative for the purpose of negotiating an 
employn1ent contract and refused to pay ernploy~ees during a stop work meeting. Adopting 
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a broad approach, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the general rationale of s.14 is 11 to 
facilitate the free and informed exercise through discussion of the choice already made which 
in this case was for a collective representative rather than of individual bargaining" (280, 
ilie 284). 
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The case is signjficant because for the first time the Court of Appeal recognised that the right 
of access included collective elements. Contrary to previous case law, the Court of Appeal 
had no difficulty irr establishing that access was not restricted to individual negotiations but 
covered collective arrangements. Importantly the case reaffi11ned that employees have the 
right of freedom of association and representation and the Act should be interpreted by the 
courts to support these choices. Furthermore the Court of Appeal noted that s.l4 rights were 
statutory and could not be contracted away. 
Payment of stopwork meetings was also addressed in Foodstuffs. The Court of Appeal noted 
that stopwork meetings to discuss contract negotiations were most likely to be held during 
working time and concluded that: 
it could hardly have b,een intended that pay should be deducted for any tin1e ho,vever short, 
during which an individual stops what he or she is doing, or that it should be reduced 'vhile 
the individual \vorks more slovvly, during tbe discussion (280, 284). 
The judgment stressed that "the Court must lean away from any construction that creates a 
disincentive to the exercise of the right of choice and representation" (280, 284). The Court 
made it clear that such a disincentive would follow from a deduction in pay whatever the 
tern1s of the employment contract. 
The Court of Appeal came to the conclusion that bargaining access was governed by the over-
riding principle of reasonableness, pointing out "it is a matter of strikin.g a fair balance 
between the employer's interests and those of the employees and their representatives." It was 
unwilling, howev~er, to define what constitutes reasonableness but instead, identified several 
factors to be considered when determining reasonableness. Thes~e included: the d,egree of 
disruption anticipated, length of meeting time, frequency of entry requests, timing of request 
and prior notice. This test of reasonablen~ess applies to both employers and bargaining 
representatives. In Skellerup l11dustries Ltd v NZ Rubber Workers U11ion [1992] I ERNZ 477 
it was held that an employ~er was not giv~en reasonable notice of a meeting which halted 
production. Similarly in Foodstuffs the Court of Appeal held that it was not reasonable to 
have on-going rights of access for negotiation once a contract had been concluded. Employers 
cannot, however, lawfully prevent authorised representatives from entering th~e workplace to 
discuss collectiv~e negotiations with their employees even if they subsequently sign individual 
contracts but do not withdraw the repr~esentative's bargaining authority. 
Ratification 
A conoern under the previous system of centralis~ed collective bargaining was that parties wer~e 
rarely consult~ed and therefore had little control over the outcomes of award negotiations. In 
an attempt to address this deficiency, the Act included a mandatory ratification clause, 
intended to ensure that both parties understood and agreed to the terms of the contract. 
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Section 16 stipulates that a ratification procedure must be in place three months prior to the 
commencement of negotiations. The details of the procedure are left to the discretion of the 
bargaining repres~entative and those to be represented. The Act is silent on the role of 
employers in ratification and fails to provide protection against the undermining of the 
ratification process . Th~ese procedures were left for the legal institutions to develop. 
The early cases dealing with ratification followed a strict interpr~etation of s.16 noting that the 
agreed ratification procedure is binding. In Grut v Downer Mining (1992] 1 ERNZ 982 the 
union clain1ed that the employer had breached the agreed ratification process by talking 
directly with employees. The Employment ~Court held that this was permissible although it 
emphasised that the ratification process was strictly a matter between the union and its 
members. 
In Shannon v l)acer Kerridge Cinemas Limited (1992] 3 ERN.Z 742 it was held that once a 
contract is ratified, it will be upheld even if the employees subsequently withdraw their 
authorisation in an effort to invalidate it. In this case, the union agreed to drastic cuts in the 
wages of ~employees and ratified th~e contract without fully inforn1ing them at a ratification 
meeting. By the time the employees leam~ed of this and withdrew their authorisation, the 
union confirmed with the employer that the contract had been ratified . 
Similar circumstances arose in Butters v Forestry Corporation of Ne1v Zealand Lintited 
(unreported, AET 880/92) where an employer acted on a ratified contract that employees 
subsequently tried to overturn by resigning from the union . The etnployer claimed that 
employees were estopped from denying the authority of the union to act on their behalf, 
notwithstanding the lack of ratification procedure. The case was, however, withdrawn before 
the Court could resolve the issue because of the employer d~esire to preserve an amicable 
working relationship which took precedence over any potential benefit of succeeding in an 
action on a legal technicality. 
Both Butters and Shannon illustrate that while the ratification procedure is mandatory, without 
detailed provision to ensure its ~enforcement the Act potentially increases the employer's 
ability to undermine collective contracting. Where the A.ct is silent, the Courts had little 
option but to reinforce the sanctity of a concluded contract and to give full weight to it. 
Subsequent case law has, however, modified this approach where the legal institutions have 
taken the view that attempts to influence the ratification procedure rnay breach s.12 and raises 
questions as to whether the employ~er is ~exerting undue influence and is therefore in breach 
of s.57. In NZ Engineering Union Inc and Ors v Shell Todd [1994] 2 ERNZ 546, an 
employer attempted to withdraw from a settlement (prior to ratification) after discovering it 
had made an error by agreeing to a clause. The Employment Court held that pending 
ratification, "the employer cannot resile from its comn1itment, for it is inherent in s. I6 that 
what is put forward for ratification is the settlement reached and not something else." The 
Employment Court concluded that it was not open to the employer to deprive ~employees of 
the opportunity to ratify the settlement by simply changing its n1ind . 
• 
Attempts to alter settlements aft,er ratification were also addressed in Arn1strong v Attorne;'-
,General [1 995] 1 ERNZ 43 where the En1ployn1ent Court held that the practice of introducing 
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new material into contracts after ratification was highly questionable and that tampering with 
ratified terms of settlement was most improper and probably constituted a breach of s. 12 of 
the Fair Trading Act 1986. 
In NZ Medical Laboratory Worke~s U11iorz v Capital Coast Health Ltd [1994] 2 ERNZ 123, 
the Employment Court further clarified the role of ratification when addressing the emerging 
practice of undermining settlements at the ratification stage. It made it clear that while 
ratification is the procedure for concluding negotiations, it is implicit in s.16 that once a . 
proposed settlement is reached it binds both parties subject to ratification, adding that the 
contract is made at the time of settlement. 
Since the passing of the Act, legal institutions have progressed some way towards establishing 
a framework of ratification that balances the competing inter~ests of employer, employees and 
bargaining representatives, while at the same time avoiding compromisin,g the intention of the 
Act. 
The process of negotiation 
In contrast to previous legislation which imposed a highly regulated collective framework for 
contract negotiation, the Act fails to establish any substantive process for negotiation. As 
stated in Bucha11ar1 v Rodney District Council [1992] 2 ERNZ 578: 
The Act generally contemplates that there will be negotiation. There are h0\\1ever no rules or 
other practical provisions indicating ho\V, when, "'here and for ho\\' long. The only aspects 
clearly covered are \Vith \vhonl the negotiation process should be conducted. There is no 
longer a legitimate exllectation of negotiation (578, 585) . 
When negotiation does take place, there is no statutory requirement that it be carried out 
fairly, an important consideration when employees, without the eollective strength of their 
union, may be at a disadvantage in their bargaining position. As Keily and Caisley 
(Harbridge, 1993: 60) point out: 
Despite the imbalance of bargaining power inher~ent in the pem1issive fratne\vork of negotiation 
established under the Act, it might have been hoped that the Courts \vould have evened up the 
situation by: 
(i) imposing a requirement to negotiate in good faith 
(ii) inoorporating substantial duties into tlte obligation to recognise the bargaining agent 
(iii) defming negotiation to include some element of compron1ise. 
The initial case law indicated, however, that the Courts were reluctant to impose such an 
interpretation on the Act. 
The issue of negotiating in good faith was debated at length by the Employment Court in 
Alliance TextilesJ wher~e an employer who recognised the union as a bargaining r~epresentative 
subsequently discouraged workers from enlisting its services and obstructed the union's 
attempts to negotiate. The central question for the Court was whether the employer's tactics 
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amounted to harsh and oppressive behaviour, or involved undue influence or duress for the 
purpos,es of s.57 of the Act. 
Due to the uncharacteristically high criminal burden of proof required to establish harsh and 
oppressive behaviour und,er the Act, the Employment Court noted that the notoriously robust 
exchanges typical of the New Zealand industrial relations scene, though unfortunately 
confrontational, is still the style in which many employers and employees do business with 
each other. Reluctant to inteiVene, the Employment Court stated: 
The Act is quite specific as to the conduct \vbich is prohibited and t11e Court is not justified 
in putting a gloss on the Act by itnporting a requirement nowhere ex-pressed in it, that tlte 
employer should ren1ain neutral when its vital interests are affected and tnaintain in that 
situation a 'hands-off' stance (982, 1023). 
Attempts to impose an obligation on employers to negotiate with bargaining representatives 
in good faith continued to fail, with the legal institutions taking a narrow interpretation that 
an employer was under no obligation to negotiate at all . Case law illustrates that if an 
employer did agree to negotiate, they were under no obligation to compromise. This was 
apparent in Skellerup where it was held that the Act enables an employer, without any prior 
negotiations, to present an othetwise lawful collective employment contract to its employees 
and insist that, unless th~ey accept its terms within a prescribed tim ~e, they would be locked 
out. In this case, the Employment Court conceded that in response to the use of a lawful 
lockout during negotiations, employees could strike. 
The question of how the implied contractual term of acting in good faith could be 
accommodated by the Act was first raised by the ~Court of Appeal in Telecom South Limited 
v Post Office Union [1992] 1 ERNZ 711 . In this case Cooke, P stated: 
tl1ere is an intplied term in evel)' en1ployrnent contract that the eo1ployers V.'ill not, \vithout 
reasonable and proper cause, conduct then1selves in a n1anner calculated or likely to destroy 
or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust betv~'een tlte etnployer and 
employee (711 , 715). 
The issue resurfaced in United Food & Chemical Workers Union of NZ v ]alley [1993] 2 
ERNZ 360 which involved a dispute over an en1ployer's unilateral decision to terminate 
association with the ~employee's union. In this case, Hardie Boys J described the Act as," not 
anti-union but may fairly be described as union neutral" (360, 370). This position was £urther 
endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Eke tone v Alliance Textiles (NZ) l.Jtd [ 1993] 2 ERNZ 786 
where Cooke, P concurr~ed that the Act is union neutral but went on to point out "there was 
no requirement for employers to be union neutral" (786, 787). This case was the long awaited 
appeal from Alliance Textiles which proved to be a n1ajor turning point in the development 
of bargaining case law. 
It was not until two years after tl1e Emp.loyment Court delivered the Alliance Textiles decision 
that the Court of Appeal finally addressed the questions of law on appeal. The appeal 
concluded that after such a delay no live issues re1nained to be resoJved between the parties, 
the contract having expired and been replaced. Th,e judgment however made important obiter 
con1ments, clarifying the fundamental rights and responsibilities of the en1ployer and 
employee in the negoti.ation process. The Court of Appeal confirmed that under the Act, an 
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employer was required to recognise the authority of the employees' bargaining representative 
but did not have to negotiate with them. The Court did, however, proffer a tentative opinion 
that if the employer wished to negotiate, bypassing an authorised representative or "to go 
behind the union's back does not seem consistent with recognising its authority" (783, 787). 
When dealing with the allegation of harsh and oppressive behaviour, the Court of Appeal 
could not avoid addressing the Act's failure to acknowledge the inherent imbalance of 
bargaining power -and the failure to make adequate statutory provisions to facilitate fair 
bargaining practices. Neither did the Act provide adequate protection against an abuse of 
bargaining power in extreme cases. In particular, those cases involving harsh and oppressive 
behaviour, where the requirements ofs.57 set a higher threshold than the common law relating 
to unfair or unconscionable contracts. 
Significantly the Court of Appeal chose to draw on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
and the lnter11atio1lal Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which confirn1ed freedom of 
association as a fundamental right. The Court of Appeal concluded that it is appropriate to 
have regard to such international instruments when interpreting the scope of rights under the 
Act noting, "where it can be done (and the Bill of Rights Act requires it) the statute is to be 
given meaning consistent with freedom of association as internationally recognised" (786, 
795). Notwithstanding these comments were obiter, they marked a significant shift in the 
legal institutions' interpretation of the Act from a narrow to a broad, holistic approach. 
A new era of holistic interpr~etation 
A new era of holistic interpretation was confirmed by the Employment Court's decision in 
A'Z Medical Laboratory Workers. In this case an employer attempted to by-pass the 
authorised bargaining representative by circulating material about a new collective contracting 
policy directly to employees and by arranging meetings without first informing or inviting the 
union. The union sought a number of remedies including: declarations as to the legality of 
the employer's actions and a pertnanent injunction preventing intenerence with the union's 
bargaining authority. The employer argued that the freedom of expression granted by s.14 
of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 allowed it to communicate directly with its employees. The 
union however maintained that any direct approach to employees who had authorised a 
bargaining representative was a direct contravention of s.l2 of the Act. 
From the outset the Employment Court made its intention clear that it would adopt the 
principles established in Eketone~ statin,g: 
that it did not agree that the observations in Eketone could be seen as obiter and therefore 
gratuitous. The vie'"'S were expressed in an official judgment of tlle Court of f\ppeal witl1 the 
concurrence of a full bench of five judges. The statements made indicate the likely line of 
policy to be adopted by the Court of Appeal in the future (123, 124-125) . 
~e.al In reaching its decision the Employment Court examined competing sections of the New 
Jes. Zealand Bill of Rights 1990 concluding that the freedom of expression afforded by s.l4 of 
iter the Bill of Rights Act 1990 is qualified by s.S which permits the la\v to place reasonable 
and limits on freedom of expression such as those set out in s.l2 of the Employment Contracts 
an 
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Act 1991. The Court also identified Capital Coast Health's obligation to be a good employer 
under the Health and Disabilities Services Act 1993, s.l2 of the Fair Trading Act 1986, which 
prohibits misleading and deceptive conduct in relation to employment, and international 
instruments such as ILO Conventions 87 and 98 as relevant factors. 
The En1ployment Court concluded that not all direct approaches to employees or attempts at 
persuasion breach s.l2 unless the motive or intention li'as to undermi11e the authorised 
representative. In this particular case, the Employment Court found that a letter issuing 
conditional suspension notices in the context of a proposed strike was a conscious attempt to 
negotiate directly with employees and to int~erfer~e with intended strike action. This amounted 
to a breach of s.l2(2) and the defendant's obligations of trust and confidence and its statutory 
good employer obligations. Accordingly the Employment Court issu,ed a permanent injunction 
restraining the defendant from any conduct, including communications to its employees, that 
breached its duty to recognise th~e union)s authority to represent its members. 
Capital Coast Health appealed the Employment Courfs finding in respect of four of the 
communications. Subsequently th~e ,Court of Appeal upheld the Etnployn1ent ~Court's decision 
on all but one communication which was in the form of a warning letter setting out the 
financial consequences of strike action. Acknowledging the difficulty of drawing the dividing 
lin~e b ~etween informing and warning (which is permissible) and threatening (which is not 
permissible), the Court. concluded in this case that a communication setting out the legitimate 
steps an employer intends to take to minimise the cost of a strike, prior to strike action) was 
lawful. 
Despite criticisn1 during this case that such a broad approach increased the complexity of legal 
problems, leading to· legal tests that unduly restricted the freedoms intended by the Act, the 
Court of Appeal remained committed to the approach established in ~K.etone stating: 
Tite Act n1ust be seen as essentially practical legislation designed to deal \vitll everyday 
practical situations. It is not appropriate to subject it to esoteric analysis or dra\v fme 
distinctions in its application. It is a tnatt~er of striking a balance betvveen the co1npeting 
interests of the parties - those of the en1ployee under s.l4 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 and 
those of tlle employee under s.l2 of tl1e En1ployntent Contracts Act 1991. It is not a case of 
one prevailing over the other, but of botl1 being given sensible and practical effect. (Capital 
Coast flea/th Ltd v NZ Med Lab Jf1orkers Union [ 1995] 2 ERNZ 320.) 
Although this case fail ~ed to establish the dividing line on what constitutes behaviour that 
breaches s.l2(2), by defining negotiation and answering the pivotal question as to whether the 
provision of information by the employer directly to employees is pern1issible, it confirmed 
the emergence of a broader interpretation of the Act. 
Communications with employees 
The issue of communications during negotiations resurfaced in the widely publicised case of 
Jvamy and ~Others v New Ze;aland Fire Sen,ice [ 1995] 1 ERNZ 724. In this case, the 
employer, without any r~eference to the autl1orised bargai~in.g r,eprese~t~tive, cir~ulated . a 
package of information to its employe~es containing information and condthons relattng to the 
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employees' future employment, including an inducement of $4,000 ~or each employee who 
signed the contract before 31 March 1995. The packages were sent directly to officers in-
charge to distribute to firefighters. It was some hours before this information was passed on 
to union officials. In line with the approach taken in Southern Pacific Hotel C~orJJ (NZ), 
("aJJital ("oast Health and Eketone the Employment Court concluded that, "read as a whole 
Parliament intended the Act to create a climate under the broad umbrella of freedom of 
association with the overall ain1 of facilitating efficient and effective employment contract 
negotiations" (724, 766). The Employment Court confirn1ed that the direct approach by an 
employer to employees during negotiations was 1110bjectionable11 and the antithesis of play fair . 
It gave a clear directive that: 
once negotiations for an e1nployn1ent contract had begun through an authorised etnployees' 
representative, no further conununication on the subject oftl1e negotiations Should be addressed 
by the en1ployer except for those required by the Act such as notices for lockouts or suspension 
of striking employees (724, 766). 
The Employment Court further asserted that it must: 
be taken to be a trespass on the employees' freedon1 of association for the ~en1ployer, "'bile 
negotiations are in progress, to seek to come bern'een the en1ployees and their representative 
by offering to employees arguments or inducements intended to have or having the effect of 
persuading the employees to act without waiting for advice from their representative or in 
disregard of that advice (724, 762). 
The Employment Court justified its decision indicating that recent case law (Eketone and 
CaJJital Coast Health) meant the Court was less ready than before to support en1ployers' 
perceived right to communicate directly with employees after a bargaining representative bad 
been authorised. Furth>ermore, interpretation of employment disputes has extended to 
encompass the NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Privacy i\.ct 1993. In particular the right 
to freedom of association established by s.17 of the NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990 has reinforced 
the freedom of employees to choose a bargaining representative. Similarly the Privacy Act 
1993 makes the release of employee's personal infortnation, such as r~emuneration rates, by 
the employ~er in media campaigns unlawful unless they first obtain the employee's consent. 
This d~ecision effectively imposed a blanket prohibition on communication regarding contract 
negotiation between an employer and its represented employees during contract negotiation. 
The decision sparked an outburst of criticism from employer groups who argued for their right 
to communicate directly with their employees. The judgment was seen as somewhat of a 
regression reminiscent of the uncompromising rigidities of the pre-Eketone era. Its impact 
was, however, short-lived. Within two months of the decision, Couling v Carter Holt Harve;; 
Ltd [ 1995] 2 ERNZ 13 7 sought to restore a balanced and commonsense approach to 
bargaining. 
1-.,he decision in Couling successfully litted the blank~et prohibition on comn1unication during 
negotiations by distinguishing Jvan1y on the facts before the ~Court. The case involved an 
action for a permanent injunction where an alleged breach of s.12 occurred during collective 
contract negotiations. The mill management were instructed to relay the company's view of 
its position in the contract negotiations if asked. It transpired that several management staff 
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did in fact communicate the company's position during conversations, some of which was in 
response to questions by employ,ees while others were unsolicited . 
The central issue for determination was wh~ether the direct comn1unications by management 
to en1ployees constituted a refusal or failure by the company to recognise the authority of the 
union to represent the hourly paid employees during negotiations. During the judgment it was 
argued that such free and frank communications between management and employees were 
an established part of the workplace culture. 
Noting that the Act does not define what constitutes a recognition of authority to represent 
under s. l2(2), the Court adopted a broad interpretation relying on the Act's objective to 
promote an efficient labour market and the principles stated in Eketone and Capital Coast 
Health. It concluded that the decision of lvamy did not extend the Jaw in relation to s. 1 2(2) 
of the Act. Colgan, J made it clear that a blanket prohibition on all direct communications 
between an employer and employees during contract negotiations would be unjust and 
impracticable. He concluded that ncommunications or information per s,e are not prohjbited 
by statute" (13 7, 155). Only negotiations that have the intention or effect of undermini11g the 
representative's authority will constitute a breach of s.12(2). 
The Employn1ent Court accepted the defendant's submission that the intention of s. l2(2) in 
the case of communications with represented employees during negotiations is to inhibit or 
prevent destructive, unfair or misleading con1munications. The Court, however, cautioned that 
each case would turn on its facts and concluded in this particular case that ''the evidence does 
not satisfy me, on the balance of probabilities, that irrespective of motive there was an 
undermining or other failure or refusal to recognise the authority of th,e bargaining 
representatives" ( 13 7, 156). 
This decision reflects a practical Gomn1onsense approach to n ~egotiations where channels of 
communication can ren1ain open without undue legal impedin1ents. 
The recent case of Neli' Zealand Air Line J:>ifots' Association, Dallas Bean & ,Qrs v Airl4'a.ys 
Corporation of Ne~v Zealand unreport~ed WEC 72/95 confirms the approach taken in Couling. 
This case involved a union application for a permanent injunction to restrain an employer 
against communicating with employees and third parties during contract negotiations. The 
Employ1nent Court ordered permanent injunctions to stop the employer's communications 
where it could be ~established they were intended to undermine the authorised representative. 
The Chief Judge held that while an employer had the right to ,communicate with employees 
during contract negotiations it was not absolute. In this case several of the communications 
were found to be biased, slanted and not legitimate examples of the provision of factual 
information. 
The approach taken in this case is consistent \:Vith that of the Court of Appeal in Capital Coast 
Health reaffirming the principle that each case must turn on its particular facts. During the 
decision the Chief Judge did however acknowledge the precarious legal position of the 
Employn1ent Court concluding: 
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I feel bound to say that the framers of the Employment Contrncts Act 1991 could not have 
intended to leave so much room ~or judicial doubt and difference of opinion as has obviously 
been left by s.12 . . . Perhaps Parliament will revisit the topic one day. I hope that day wi11 
con1e soon. It is asking too much to expect the courts to read the legislators' minds to the 
extent that has been necessary in these cases (WEC 72/95). 
The role of the specialist institutions 
There are several compelling reasons why a specialist jurisdiction should remain. An analysis 
of bargaining case law concludes that the much-vaunted era of "free bargaining" has led to 
workplace conflict which is costly and contrary to the Act's aims. Rather than playing the 
peripheral role envisaged by the Act, the new legal institutions have found themselves at the 
centre of bargaining conflict. Cognisant of their prescribed role under the Act, they were 
initially reluctant to intervene in the bargaining process. However, because the Act failed to 
provide the detailed provisions necessary to facilitate efficient bargaining, the legal institutions 
were lett with little alternative but to intercede. Contrary to claims that the legal institutions 
have exhibited "extraordinary resistance" to the implementation of the Act, case law indicates 
they have applied themselves diligently to the difficult task of interpreting inconsistent, 
incomplete and philosophically flawed bargaining provisions in an effort to develop a 
workable bargaining structure. Far from sabotaging the Act, they have en1erged as saviours 
of the bargaining system. 
Neither does the case law support criticisms that the legal institutions have undermined the 
aims of Parliament by pursuing a minim.ah.st approach and by implying terms not expressed 
in the Act. Such claims are reactionary and transparently self-serving. There is nothing 
unusual about court intervention in contractual arrangements to ensure a fair and just outcome. 
As Lord Denning noted, "a man,s(sic) right to work is just as important to him, i.f not more 
important than his rights to property. Courts intervene every day to protect rights to property. 
They must intervene to protect the right to work" (Denning, 1979: 154). 
Claims that the institutions resorted to "judicial mysticism .. are likewise unfounded since there 
is nothing mysterious about the practice of implying t~erms in the absence of any express 
provisions. This is a logical and legitimate legal process, for as Cooke concluded, "The 
inevitable duty of the Courts is to make law" (Cooke, 1990: 4). Accordingly, in the absence 
of express statutory provisions, as is commonplace in the Act, the legal institutions had no 
option but to draw on past employment law precedents to resolve current legal problems. 
Where £undamental rights and freedoms are under threat, legal institutions have historically 
turned to a wider context of statutory and international law to develop new law. This is 
progressive, not regressive. Th~e crux of these criticisms is not that specialist legal institutions 
have failed to operate in line with Parliament,s intentions but rather, that their decisions did 
not accord with the economic agenda of their detractors. 
Calls for the abolition of the specialist employment jurisdiction and a return to con1mon law 
and commonsense also fail to recognise that the specialist institutions have, in practice, 
adopted a "commonsense approach" developed by the highest court in the land, the Court of 
Appeal. Establishing a general jurisdiction for employment law would not provide the 
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outcon1es sought by critics of specialist legal institutions. The common law of contract is 
dynamic and has long since progressed beyond classical principles of contract based on the 
shibboleths of freedom to contract and sanctity of contract. Modern courts of general 
jurisdiction no longer inflict legal rules that are out-moded and unjust. As Cooke observed, 
"the sad fact is that the Courts evolved a law of contract which was so unjust in its workings 
that the legislature had to correct it on a n1ajor scale, giving back the Courts a control which 
they should never have abandoned by self-imposed doctrine~~~ (Cooke, 1990: 2). 
While the Act created "new" l ~egal institutions, their role ren1ains fundamentaJly unchanged 
Progressively they have come fuH circle, reaffirming the conclusion reached by Pember 
Reeves over a century earlier, that judicial intervention is necessary to "fairly hold the scales 
between employer and employed 11 (Deeks, 1982: 24). The specialist legal institutions have, 
contrary to the claim.s of their critics, succeeded to the extent that they have maintained a 
dynamic equilibrium where the scales of dissatisfaction are fairly evenly balanced. Unlike 
their predecessors, however, who had a statutory mandate to intervene, they continue to labour 
in "less than a fully certain and stable legal situation111 (Goddard CJ, WEC 72/95). Reworking 
bargaining provisions is long overdue. 
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